By almost any measure, the Bush administration’s watchdog at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has been far less active than either his predecessor or inspectors general at agencies of similar size. And, at a minimum, NASA’s watchdog, Robert Cobb, created an appearance of being too close to the department he oversees. These were among the findings of a probe initiated following a litany of allegations from inside the NASA Inspector General’s office (IG). The investigation was undertaken on behalf of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and conducted by the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Among the findings, according to the Orlando Sentinel, were that “the number of audit reports issued by Cobb's office plummeted from 62 in 2000 to seven during the first half of the 2006 fiscal year.” The probe also found, according to the Sentinel, that an audit safety team was abolished and that witnesses said IG investigations were quashed, including several related to national security and safety. In addition, serious questions about Cobb’s independence from NASA’s senior management were raised by HUD investigators. Cobb, for example, told NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe about the existence of search warrants related to a criminal probe, before the warrants were executed. The PCIE’s Integrity Committee found that Cobb’s actions amounted to an abuse of authority and had created “the appearance of a lack of independence.”

Follow-up:
Despite bipartisan calls from Congress for Cobb to step down, he remains in his post as NASA’s inspector general. A bill introduced by Senator Claire McCaskill, a Missouri Democrat, and signed by President Bush aims to strengthen the professionalism of the inspectors general and the process through which allegations against the IG’s themselves are investigated. A NASA spokeswoman told the Center, “The NASA administrator proposed to the PCIE chair that the IG attend management training, obtain an executive coach, and meet with the deputy administrator on a bimonthly basis.” She also said the PCIE Integrity Committee accepted the proposals and closed the investigation, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin notified Cobb of the steps he needed to take, and “those steps have been taken.”

Photo: NASA Inspector General Robert W. Cobb. Photo credit: National Aeronotics and Space Administration

In February 2003, seven astronauts died as the space shuttle Columbia broke up on re-entry over Texas. The cause of the disaster was a briefcase-size chunk of foam that broke off during launch, damaging the shuttle’s thermal protection system — but the failings were deeper, and harked back to the nation’s first space disaster, when the shuttle Challenger exploded seconds after takeoff in 1986. According to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, “We are convinced that the management practices overseeing the Space Shuttle Program were as much a cause of the accident as the foam that struck the left wing.” In brief, according to the report, “By the eve of the Columbia accident, institutional practices that were in effect at the time of the Challenger accident — such as inadequate concern over deviations from expected performance, a silent safety program, and schedule pressure — had returned to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).” Poor communication of safety information, a culture that stifled professional differences of opinion, and a de-emphasis of sound engineering practices also contributed to an organizational failure that brought about the space shuttle tragedy, the report said. Years of cost-cutting and pressures to do more with less led NASA management to cut corners, investigators concluded. Ultimately, this led to a situation in which “mission management failed to detect weak signals that the Orbiter was in trouble and take corrective action.”

Follow-up:
A NASA spokeswoman told the Center, “After the accident and before launching the next shuttle, NASA spent more than two years doing rigorous testing, engineering analysis, redesigns, and modifications to reduce or eliminate the issues that contributed to the Columbia accident.” A new Crew Exploration Vehicle is being developed that will eventually replace the remaining space shuttle orbiters.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

A massive backlog of patent applications persists at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), a problem that experts warn can dampen innovation, discourage investors, and make inventors vulnerable to theft and exploitation. The production quotas for patent examiners have not changed since 1976 and current employees say they have trouble assessing today’s complex patents in the allotted time. Beginning in the 1990s the number of applications boomed, with a record 495,095 submissions during 2008. The backlog of unresolved applications has grown apace, increasing by nearly 73 percent between fiscal years 2002 and 2007 to about 730,000. Turnover is also a problem. Between 2002 and 2006, one patent examiner quit for nearly every two examiners the office hired and 70 percent of the examiners who left had worked at the office for less than five years. On average, applicants wait 25 months for their first response and more than 30 months to receive a patent. The USPTO has “a number of initiatives underway” to address these problems, according to a patent office spokeswoman, including increased cooperation with the office’s counterparts in other countries and a program that guarantees a full review within 12 months to inventors who provided additional documentation.

Follow-up:
The patent office plans to hire 1,200 additional people annually until 2013, but “hiring alone simply is not the answer to the growth of filings and complexity in the patent system,” Jon W. Dudas, an undersecretary at the Department of Commerce, told a House committee in February 2008. The office has also responded with bonuses, a new exercise facility, flexible work hours, telecommuting options, and special pay rates. Employees now cite these perks as major motivations for sticking with their jobs, but find they are still working overtime and using their vacation hours to keep up with the work load.

The Bureau of the Census envisioned a high-tech effort for 2010, with hundreds of thousands of census-takers inventorying America’s population with the aid of new hand-held computers. Instead, crucial parts of the census operation are reverting to a more expensive paper-based system. New technology seemed to promise increased accuracy and cost-efficiency, but field tests in 2004 and 2006 showed that the hand-held devices the bureau had bought were slow and unreliable. Later in 2006, the Census Bureau changed direction by offering a contract for almost $600 million to Harris Corporation to develop better devices. At a 2008 census “dress rehearsal” meant to identify kinks in the system, though, Harris’ devices also proved problematic. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) says the hand-held computers have experienced memory overloads and other technical glitches. In April 2008, the bureau announced it would nix the devices in the follow-up stage of the census, in which census employees track down the estimated 35 percent of Americans who are unlikely to return the bureau’s written survey. The bureau does intend to use the hand-held computers to verify address and map information in early 2009, during the first nationwide field operation of the 2010 census: address canvassing. Cost estimates for the census, which were at $11.5 billion earlier this year, have swelled to between $13.7 billion and $14.5 billion, and some census-watchers worry about whether the process will start on schedule. Census data determines how congressional districts are drawn and how some $300 billion in federal funds are distributed annually, so greater accuracy promotes more equitable decision-making. The bureau’s failures could lead to a less accurate measure of Americans — who they are and how they live.

Follow-up:
Reports on the census from the GAO say that plans for increasing the accuracy of the census “show promise” but that the bureau must keep close tabs on the performance of the hand-held devices. The GAO recently named the census as one of 13 “urgent issues” for President-Elect Barack Obama and the 111th Congress. “Soon after taking office,” said the GAO, “the new administration will need to address the significant management and technology challenges facing this complex and costly effort.” A spokesman for the bureau said it is confident that the census will start on time and that the process is back on track.

Kevin J. Martin has drawn bipartisan criticism for his leadership of the five-member Federal Communications Commission, the independent agency charged with “regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable.” On January 8, 2008, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce informed Martin that it was initiating an investigation into the FCC’s “management practices that may adversely affect the agency’s operation,” according to a letter signed by committee chairman John Dingell, Democrat of Michigan; ranking member Joe Barton, Republican of Texas; Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations chairman Bart Stupak, Democrat of Michigan; and Subcommittee ranking member John Shimkus, Republican of Illinois. The investigation turned up multiple complaints from FCC staff members relating to Martin’s suppression of studies that did not support his agenda of looser media ownership rules and changes to cable television pricing structures, according to memos obtained by The Washington Post. “The bottom line,” wrote the committee’s investigators, “is that the [FCC] process appears broken and most of the blame appears to rest with Chairman Martin.” Martin told Dingell in a letter, “I agree that the Commission should conduct its affairs fairly, openly, and transparently to serve the public interest,” and noted that 95 percent of Commission items have been adopted by a bipartisan majority of Commissioners.

Follow-up:
On December 9, 2008, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce released its report, “Deception and Distrust: The Federal Communications Commission Under Chairman Kevin J. Martin.” The document, according to Stupak, “details some of the most egregious abuses of power, suppression of information, and manipulation of data under Chairman Martin’s leadership.” The FCC issued a statement noting that the committee “did not find or conclude that there were any violations of rules, laws, or procedures.” On January 14, 2009, Martin announced he would step down from his position, effective January 20.

Photo: FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin. Photo credit: Federal Communications Commission