On September 8, 2002, Bush administration officials hit the national airwaves to advance the argument that Iraq had acquired aluminum tubes designed to enrich uranium. In an appearance on NBC's Meet the Press, for example, Vice President Dick Cheney flatly stated that Saddam Hussein "now is trying through his illicit procurement network to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium."

Condoleezza Rice, who was then Bush's national security adviser, followed Cheney that night on CNN's Late Edition. In answer to a question from Wolf Blitzer on how close Saddam Hussein's government was to developing a nuclear capability, Rice said: "We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. We do know there have been shipments going into . . . Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to—high-quality aluminum tools that only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs."

In April 2001, however, the Energy Department had concluded that, "while the gas centrifuge application cannot be ruled out, we assess that the procurement activity more likely supports a different application, such as conventional ordnance production." During the preparation of the September 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, the Energy Department and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research stated their belief that Iraq intended to use the tubes in a conventional rocket program, but the Central Intelligence Agency's contrary view prevailed.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence subsequently concluded that postwar findings supported the assessments of the Energy Department and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

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Over the past two and a half years, researchers at the Fund for Independence in Journalism have sought to document every public statement made by eight top Bush administration officials from September 11, 2001, to September 11, 2003, regarding (1) Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction and (2) Iraq's links to Al Qaeda. Although both had been frequently cited as rationales for the U.S. war in Iraq, by 2005 it was known that these assertions had not, in fact, been true.

The centerpiece of this project is an exhaustive, searchable, and robustly indexed database of all public statements on the two topics by President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and White House Press Secretaries Ari Fleischer and Scott McClellan. These statements were painstakingly collected from the websites of the White House, State Department, and Defense Department as well as from transcripts of interviews and briefings, texts of speeches and testimony, prepared statements, and the like.

Also included are statements in the same two categories that appeared in major newspapers and on television programs, were part of public statements by other officials, or were contained in government studies or reports, books, and the like from September 11, 2001, to December 31, 2007. Secondary material from reports and books was included in the two-year database only in cases where specific dates were available. Other noteworthy material was included for context and completeness.

The $61.45 billion reconstruction program in Iraq will undergo a wholesale transition when most U.S. troops depart at the end of the year. Many reconstruction projects currently under the responsibility of the military will be administered by the State Department once troops leave. The latest report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reveals daunting transition tasks for State: closing reconstruction teams in provincial areas, opening diplomatic posts in volatile regions of Iraq, taking over the police force development and doubling civilian personnel from 8,000 to 17,000.

The increasing dependence on the State Department and contractors comes at a time when the IG has been critical of the Pentagon and State for being incapable of tracking where reconstruction dollars go currently.

These ambitious efforts coincide with a period of instability, in Iraq and across the Middle East. In recent months thousands of Iraqis have protested corruption and lack of services. In addition, the Iraqi Security Forces personnel have also been targeted more often than usual.

State intends to set up Embassy branch offices across the country, which usually have temporary mission spans of three to five years. The branch offices’ priority, according to State, is to mitigate Arab-Kurd, Sunni- Shia, and provincial tensions. These branches will face centuries-old conflicts and ambivalent attitudes towards the U.S. coupled with the challenges of short-mission length and low staffing levels.

An October 2010 report by the State inspector general noted that “it appears that provincial staffing is now being driven by budget constraints, rather than an appraisal of what is needed to accomplish the mission; certainly there is no indication that the missions have been redefined or reduced as funding and staffing projections shrink.”

Reports

9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004.

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, D.C., 2005.

Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (the "Duelfer Report"), 2004.

• Vol.1
• Vol.2
• Vol.3

Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence. Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2007.

Levin, Carl. Report of an Inquiry into the Alternative Analysis of the Issue of an Iraq-Al Qaeda Relationship. Washington, D.C.: Senate Armed Services Committee (minority staff), 2004.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. Washington, D.C.: 108th Congress, 2004.

George W. Bush is the 43rd president of the United States.

Richard "Dick" Cheney is the vice president of the United States. As the secretary of defense under President George H.W. Bush, he directed the U.S. military effort in the 1991 Gulf War. After leaving the government Cheney became the chairman and chief executive officer of Halliburton Company. He was President Gerald Ford's chief of staff from 1975 to 1977. From 1979 to 1989, he served as a U.S. Representative from Wyoming.

Ari Fleischer was the White House press secretary from January 20, 2001, to July 14, 2003, serving as President Bush's principal spokesperson and conducting daily news briefings. Prior to his White House appointment, he served as the senior communications adviser and spokesman for the 2000 Bush-Cheney campaign.

Scott McClellan was the White House press secretary from July 15, 2003, when he succeeded Ari Fleischer, to May 10, 2006; before that he was the principal deputy White House press secretary. During the 2000 presidential campaign he was George W. Bush's traveling press secretary.

Colin Powell was the secretary of state from January 20, 2001, to January 26, 2005. His 35-year army career included assignments as national security adviser to Ronald Reagan from 1987 to 1989 and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1989 until 1993, when he retired as a four-star general.